The Wandering Lens

Published by Foundation Books; Hurst & Company, London, 2009. 276 pages. Rs. 895.

(Deb Mukharji was a member of the Indian Foreign Service. He served in Islamabad, 1968-71, Dhaka, 1977-1980 and was High Commissioner to Bangladesh, 1995-2000)

Bangladesh and Pakistan: Flirting with Failure in South Asia is essentially a political (and military) history of the two countries since 1971. Yet there is, notably in the case of Pakistan, sufficient recounting of the past to make the present more comprehensible. William Milam was the US ambassador to Dhaka when public agitation forced General Ershad to step down in 1990 and the restoration of democracy which followed. He found himself representing Washington in Islamabad a few years later when another general, Pervez Musharraf, dismissed the civilian government to start another decade of military or quasi military rule. Milam thus had a ringside view of two significant developments in India's neighbourhood.

In the Preface, the author describes his effort as an interpretative book on Bangladesh and Pakistan based on his

own experience adding that "economic and social developments feature only briefly". This is only partially true, as the author's probing into history and the stimuli that motivate the countries do indeed reflect social and economic issues in the broader sense.

Bangladesh and Pakistan is in fact two books rolled into one. Besides their common origin in 1947 and uncomfortable cohabitation for the next twenty four years, they have been on different trajectories. Though the praetorian attitudes inculcated in Pakistan days may have motivated military interventions in Bangladesh in earlier years, January 11, 2007, was in a different category following a collapse of the political system and the military have vindicated itself by the elections, even as there would a message to future civilian governments that some of their past errors should not be repeated. The long-lasting take-overs by Generals Ayub, Zia ul Haq and Musharraf had no legitimate excuse.

Milam demonstrates a rare understanding of the origins of Pakistan, not too often seen even in India with its Punjab or UP-Muslim centric analyses or understanding. He

refers to the critical importance of the Muslim League electoral victory in Bengal as contributing to the creation of Pakistan when the inclusive Unionists were in power in Punjab and Sindh. It was late in the day that even the North West Frontier Province had to determine its future through a referendum. Even in Bengal, he points out, the Bengali-speaking Muslim Leaguers may have been happier with an undivided Bengal (which is why Jinnah had appointed non Bengali-speaking leaders to head the Muslim League administration). Milam also points out the tight rope walking of Jinnah in selling the idea of Pakistan to disparate groups. It was to be the home to South Asian Muslims. But was it? In the author's words, Jinnah knew the importance of "... a delicate balance between the interests of the majority and the minority Muslims, and a studied and creative ambiguity about the objectives of the League and the nature of a Pakistani state". This "creative ambiguity" may have elicited support for the creation of Pakistan, but did not assist in the establishment of a clearly defined sense of nationhood. (This was realized early enough by the "minority" Muslims. As Choudhry Khaliquzzaman relates poignantly in Pathway to Pakistan, when asked on the eve of his departure for Karachi in August 1947 what would happen to those he left

behind, Jinnah silently left the room).

Another insight of Milam not often recognized or admitted (for their own separate reasons in India, Bangladesh or Pakistan) is that a stage had been reached when West Pakistan wanted to be free of East Pakistan and its numbers. As Milam says, "In essence, West Pakistan's political and social leaders preferred a truncated Pakistan to giving the East the right to run its own affairs, and an equal voice in the national affairs of a United Pakistan". Here one may underline the role of Bhutto's ambition. There were economic reasons as well. The 3rd five year plan of Pakistan had envisaged a substantial resource transfer from Punjab to East Pakistan, which was unacceptable to the West's business and industry. I recall the editor of Bhutto's newspaper telling me plaintively in March, 1971, that India should take over these troublesome Bengalis and save Pakistan.

Milam's understanding and analysis of Pakistan shows a degree of scholarship and insight. In the case of Bangladesh, however, he appears to have relied heavily on the historiography of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party of General

Ziaur Rahman and there is an unmistakable tinge of aloofness from a possible Awami League point of view. It is not enough to acknowledge that social developments do not form a part of his canvas, for an understanding of socio-cultural developments is the very basis of understanding Bangladesh. Mujib's regime is dismissed for its socialism, inefficiency and corruption. For a more comprehensive picture the international constraints under which he suffered (including indifference of the United States in a year of famine) should have found mention. The killing of Mujib, according to him, was due to increasing disaffection and "primary among those who took offence were a number of mid-level officers who felt aggrieved". Milam ignores persisting belief about external encouragement of the killings, or the fact it was only after the August, 1975 coup that a number of Islamic countries and China established diplomatic relations with Dhaka. Or that the person elevated to succeed Mujib, Khondkar Mushtaque Ahmed, was known not only for his proximity to the United States but also for intrigues during the War of Liberation as a member of the government in exile. And if Mujib was killed by aggrieved

young officers, there is no explanation of the November 3 jail killings, when imprisoned senior Awami League leaders were killed in prison in cold blood, the killers receiving indemnity from the state.

While admitting that "The continual flirtation with Islamists by every government since Mujib has been part of the problem", Milam is reluctant to amplify the role of Zia in rehabilitation of such forces to strengthen his position. The author's unquestioning acceptance of BNP hagiography leads him into further shallows, notably on the question of Zia's adoption of Bangladeshi nationalism. Explaining the concept as territorial vis-à-vis ethnic was a laboured post facto exercise by Zia loyalists. When the concept was enunciated in 1977, when the present reviewer was in Bangladesh, there was not the slightest doubt in anyone's mind that it was an assertion of the Muslim identity of Bengal, as against the linguistic/cultural impulses that had, besides the question of economic exploitation, informed the East's struggle against West Pakistan for two decades. It was a return to the Two Nation theory of the Lahore Resolution calling for the formation of two or more Muslim majority states. In fact, history may judge that the promotion of Bangladeshi Nationalism

caused a U-turn in the evolution of Bangladeshi society and politics, made possible the emergence of Islamist forces and lies at the root of much of Bangladesh's problems today. Factual limitations or analytical errors notwithstanding, one must agree with the author's view that the record of Ziaur Rahman is better than that of Zia ul Haq of Pakistan who was in the forefront of those who entered into a "Faustian" accord with Islamist forces and the jihadists they spawned and left "an atmosphere of bigotry, fanaticism, and distorted values" (Ian Talbot as quoted by the author).

Milam notes that in early years, the rhetoric of Pakistan was communal. "It projected past Muslim glories into the present, and was uniformly and categorically anti Indian." The communal anti-Hindu and therefore anti-India diet in Pakistan (and Bangladesh) has, "diverted both countries from healthier, more democratic development". The stage was set for a praetorian state where the army became the last refuge of the people and the identity problem of Pakistan further confused by the emergence of the army as the state itself. "The tentacles of the army reached deeper and deeper into the fabric of Pakistani society under Zia, and this trend has continued in

subsequent governments, and expanded in the Musharraf regime".

Understandably, the author does not dwell on the fact that it is Washington's continuing support that has permitted the Pakistan army play the role that it has for the past five decades. Interestingly, perhaps significantly, while acknowledging the army's contribution to the state of affairs in Pakistan, he also concludes, "Yet Pakistan is not a failed state, not while the military remains a coherent institution. But it is a country of failed politics with a failed political class". If this conclusion is reflected in Washington's future policies, the Pakistan military would have no cause to change its ways. The author also notes that the use of jihadists by the army, first in Kashmir and then in Afghanistan has culminated in the monster turning on the master.

The author is candid in the expression of distaste for the political classes of Pakistan ("the myopic political class of Pakistan have failed to overcome the country's historical contradictions and institutional deficiencies" and found the Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif governments "feckless, democratically elected but undemocratic governments") while in Bangladesh the acquisition of power was the sole

objective. He notes that Bangladesh is ahead of Pakistan in socio-economic indicators and in Bengali culture "there is a willingness to change".

Bangladesh and Pakistan: Flirting with Failure in South Asia is not only eminently readable, but also a most timely reminder of the volatile atmosphere in two significant states of South Asia. In Milam's view, "like a thorn in the foot, Islamism is an unnatural addition to the Bangladeshi polity that can be easily removed when governments become more efficient and effective". However, in Pakistan, if the ambiguity of the army towards the jihadists "persists under the civilian government now in charge, Pakistan may become, before 'The War on Terror' ends, part of the terrorist problem instead of part of the solution".

(Published in 'THE BOOK REVIEW'
March, 2009)